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spending on national defense has
risen substantially during the past
several years. Including supplemen-
tal appropriations, the budget for na-
tional defense this year will exceed
$487 billion. In inflation-adjusted
terms, it will surpass its Cold War
peak, reached in 1985 (all budget fig-
ures refer to fiscal years). 
With its high concentration of de-
fense contractors, the New England
economy benefited significantly from
the buildup during the Carter and
Reagan administrations. Is the re-
gion likely to see a repeat? We don’t
think so. To be sure, large defense
firms in New England are receiving
some impressive, multimillion-dollar
contracts. And the overall dollar
amount of contracts awarded to de-
fense contractors headquartered in
New England is increasing every
year.  Nevertheless,  there  are  a
number of reasons the total impact
of defense spending on the region’s
economy and jobs will probably fall
considerably short of what it was in
the 1980s.
Although national defense spend-
ing is high in absolute terms, its
share of the total U. S. economy re-
mains far below the Cold War peak.
In the mid-1980s, national defense
spending  rose  to  6.2  percent  of
GDP. This year, we estimate it will
be a little over 4 percent.
New  England  still  gets  more
than  its  “fair  share”  of  defense
prime contract dollars—in 2002 it
received 8.2 percent, even though
it accounted for only 5 percent of
the national population and 6 per-
cent of national production. But
the region’s share of total contracts
has fallen well below its 12 percent
average in the 1980s. Connecticut
and Massachusetts ranked ninth
and tenth in defense contracts in
2002. They were fourth and fifth in
1980. Had New England defense
firms continued to grow in line
with the national trend, they would
be taking in nearly $17 billion a
year, as opposed to the $11 billion
they have averaged since 2000.
New England contractors’ sharp
loss of share since the 1980s stems
from two broad causes: product
mix and geographic change. The
national composition of defense
spending  is  shifting  away  from
hard goods like missiles, ships, and
tanks to other supplies and ser-
vices like fuel, construction, data
processing,  and  administration
and management support. This is
significant  because  New  Eng-
land’s  defense  contractors  have
tended to specialize in hard goods.
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Defense spending has risen in real dollars...








...but has fallen as a share of GDP
PERCENT OF GDP
notes: Defense spending in real dollars is fiscal year budget authority (allocated money), including
supplemental appropriations.
Defense spending as a share of GDP is actual fiscal year outlays (money spent); 2003 and 2004
figures are authors’ estimates.
GDP value for fiscal year 2004 is based on CBO estimates; all other values are actual fiscal year
GDP.
sources: OMB, CBO, and DoD data reported by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
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prime contracts in 2000–02 with 1988–90, this
shift in the product mix has caused the region
a $3.3 billion loss in hard goods contracts while
yielding only a $1.6 billion increase in services
contracts. Within hard goods, the changes in
product mix since the Cold War have favored
only New England’s aircraft sector.
Then there is the shifting geography of de-
fense spending. Within most product cate-
gories,  contracts  are  increasingly  being
awarded to firms in other parts of the coun-
try. This has cost the region $4.1 billion in de-
fense contracts relative to what it received in
the late 1980s, with the largest losses in air-
craft, missiles, ships, and the “other supplies
and services” category. The shift away from
New England might have resulted from a
number of different factors—changes in mil-
itary technology, costs of production, mergers
among defense firms, or the loss of political
clout useful in obtaining military contracts—
although our calculations cannot determine the role that each fac-
tor might have played. Overall, about 30 percent of New Eng-
land defense contractors’ loss of prime contracts since the late
1980s is due to the changing product mix of national defense
spending, and the remaining 70 percent to the changing geogra-
phy of purchases. 
In the end, New Englanders probably care more about the ef-
fect on local employment and incomes than on prime contract dol-
lars—which, after all, partially end up flowing to subcontractors
and vendors located elsewhere. It is difficult to calculate this im-
pact. But it is clear that the region’s defense contractors are sub-
ject to the same forces as other local manufacturing and services
employers. Defense firms are reducing costs through restructur-
ing their operations, adopting labor-saving technologies, and
shifting jobs to lower-cost locations, including foreign countries. 
Looking ahead for the next year or so, defense spending will
likely continue to increase—but mostly because of postwar op-
erations in the Middle East and the continuing overseas war on
terrorism rather than because of any increases in military pro-
curement that might bring additional jobs to the region. And while
federal government spending on homeland security offers anoth-
er source of stimulus, the total homeland security budget is less
than one-tenth the size of the defense budget and is not slated to
grow as rapidly in percentage terms. Thus, additional increases in
defense and related spending are likely to have only a muted im-
pact on the New England economy for the foreseeable future.S
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PRIME CONTRACT awards (measured in dollars) are the most commonly used data
for analyzing how defense purchases from business firms and research establish-
ments affect state and regional economies. But they also have well-known limita-
tions. Prime contracts convey the location of only the final stages of production; they
do not include the value of work performed by subcontractors and other vendors. For
example, an aircraft assembly plant in the Midwest may use prototypes developed in
California and instruments produced in New England, but the prime contract dollars
will all be attributed to the Midwest. In addition, prime contracts can sometimes be
allotted to a company’s primary facility rather than to its actual production sites. In
New England, for example, General Dynamics Electric Boat contracts are allocated
exclusively to Connecticut, even though the company also operates a large subma-
rine fabrication facility in Rhode Island.
The Pentagon has sponsored an alternative modeling approach to measuring and
forecasting the geographic allocation of military spending. This model traces defense
purchases from various industries—including the industries that supply inputs—and
then figures the share of national production of these industries located in each
state. Using this approach, we calculate that New England’s overall share of defense
industry purchases drops a little, and individual state rankings for 2002 differ:
Massachusetts moves up from tenth to ninth place; Connecticut drops from ninth
place to twentieth.
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US DoD Prime Cuts
Although national defense spending is on the rise, changes in product mix and geographic location 
have left New England with a leaner stake.
($ billions)
Total New England Defense Prime Contracts 11.0 -3.8 2.0 -1.7 -4.1
Major Hard Goods 7.9 -4.5 1.7 -3.3 -2.9
Aircraft 3.2 -0.3 0.5 0.4 -1.2
Missile and space systems 0.5 -2.3 0.4 -1.8 -1.0
Ships 2.1 -0.3 0.3 -0.5 -0.1
Tank-automotive 0.0 -0.5 0.1 -0.2 -0.4
Weapons 0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.3
Ammunition 0.3 0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.3
Electronics and communications equipment 1.6 -1.2 0.4 -1.2 -0.4
Other Supplies and Services* 3.1 0.7 0.3 1.6 -1.2
*Includes items such as fuel, construction and building supplies, data processing, and other services.
notes: (1) Factors may not sum exactly due to rounding. (2) All figures in current dollars; an analysis with constant dollar values produced qualitatively similar results.
source: U.S. Department of Defense, Prime Contract Awards by Region and State 